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We study analytically and numerically Minority Games in which agents may invest in different
assets (or markets), considering both the canonical and the grand-canonical versions. We find that
the likelihood of agents trading in a given asset depends on the relative amount of information
available in that market. More specifically, in the canonical game players play preferentially in the
stock with less information. The same holds in the grand canonical game when agents have positive
incentives to trade, whereas when agents payoff are solely related to their speculative ability they
display a larger propensity to invest in the information-rich asset. Furthermore, in this model one
finds a globally predictable phase with broken ergodicity.
PACS numbers: :
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of systems of heterogeneous adaptive agents
through Minority Games (MGs) [1, 2] has attracted much
interest from statistical physicists. Despite the simplicity
of the interactions between agents, these models generate
rich static and dynamical structures which can often be
well understood at the mathematical level through the
use of spin-glass techniques [3, 4]. While the MG has
found applications in different types of problems (see for
example [5]), it was originally designed to address the is-
sue of how the microscopic behavior of traders – specula-
tors in particular – may give rise to the anomalous global
fluctuation phenomena observed empirically in financial
markets. In this respect the most successful version of
the MG has perhaps been the grand-canonical MG [6, 7],
in which traders may abstain from investing, so that the
traded volume fluctuates in time.
The core of MGs is the assumption that traders react
to the receipt of an information pattern (be it exogenous
or endogenous) by taking a simple trading decision such
as buying or selling. The key control parameter is the
ratio between the number of traders and the ‘complexity’
of the information space, measured by the number of
possible patterns. In general, when this ratio exceeds
a certain threshold MGs undergo a phase transition to
a macroscopically efficient state where it is not possible
to predict statistically whether a certain decision will be
fruitful or not based on the received information alone.
Real markets are typically formed by different assets
and are characterized by non trivial correlations [8–10].
These correlations arise from the underlying behavior
of the economics (the fundamentals) but they are also
“dressed” by the effect of financial trading. In this pa-
per, we will use the Minority Game in order to investi-
gate how speculative trading affects the different assets
in a market. Versions of MG where agents are engaged
in different contexts have already been introduced and
studied [11, 12]. More precisely, we shall investigate how
speculative trading contributes to financial correlations,
and how speculators distribute their trading volume de-
pending on the information content of the different asset
markets.
Our first result is that speculative trading does not
contribute in a sensible manner to financial correlations,
and if it does, it likely contributes a negative correlation.
The reason is that, within the schematic picture of the
MG, speculators are uniquely driven by profit considera-
tions and totally disregard risk. The same cannot be said
for strategies on lower frequencies (buy and hold) where
risk minimization of the portfolio becomes important.
Our second main conclusion is that, when there are
positive incentives to trade, speculators invest preferen-
tially on the asset with the smallest information content.
This apparently paradoxical conclusion is reverted when
speculators have no incentive to trade, other than making
a profit. This is due to the fact that speculators, when
they are forced to trade also contribute to information
asymmetries.
Finally, with respect to the usual classification in
phases of the MG, we find a considerably richer phase
diagram where different components of the market may
be in different phases. These conclusions are derived for
the case of a market composed of two assets, which allows
for a simpler treatment and provides a more transparent
picture. Their validity can be extended in straightfor-
ward ways to the case of markets with a generic number
of assets.
The paper is articulated in three parts. Section II is
dedicated to the study of a canonical MG where agents
can choose on which of two assets to invest. In Sec-
tion III we discuss the grand-canonical version of this
model, where agents are also allowed to refrain from in-
vesting. Finally, we formulate our conclusions in Sec. IV.
The mathematical analysis of the models we consider is
a generalization of calculations abundantly discussed in
the literature (see [3, 4] for recent reviews). We therefore
won’t go into the details, limiting ourselves to stressing
the main differences with the standard cases.
2II. CANONICAL MINORITY GAME WITH
TWO ASSETS
We consider the case of a market with two assets γ ∈
{−1, 1} and N agents. At each time step t, agents receive
two information patterns µγ ∈ {1, . . . , Pγ}, chosen at
random and independently with uniform probability. It
is assumed that Pγ scales linearly with N , and their ratio
is denoted by αγ = Pγ/N . Every agent i disposes of
two “strategies” aiγ = {aµγiγ } (one for each asset), that
prescribe a binary action a
µγ
iγ ∈ {−1, 1} (buy/sell) for
each possible information pattern. Each component a
µγ
iγ
is assumed to be selected randomly and independently
with uniform probability and is kept fixed throughout
the game. Traders keep tracks of their performance in the
different markets through a score function Uiγ(t) which
is updated with the following rule:
Uiγ(t+ 1) = Uiγ(t)− aµγ(t)iγ Aγ(t) (1)
where
Aγ(t) =
N∑
j=1
a
µγ(t)
jγ δsj(t),γ (2)
represents the ‘excess demand’ or the total bid on market
γ (the factor 1/
√
N appears here for mathematical con-
venience) and is usually taken as a proxy of (log) returns,
i.e. log pγ(t+1) = log pγ(t) +λAγ(t). The Ising variable
si(t) = sign [Ui,+1(t)− Ui,−1(t)] (3)
indicates the asset in which player i invests at time t,
which is simply the one with the largest cumulated score.
It is the minus sign on the right-hand side of (1) that
enforces the minority-wins rule in both markets: Agents
will invest in that market where their strategy provides
a larger payoff −aµγ(t)iγ Aγ(t) (or a smaller loss).
It is possible to characterize the asymptotic behaviour
of the multi-agent system (1) with a few macroscopic ob-
servables, such as the predictability H and the volatility
σ2, defined respectively as [13]
H =
∑
γ∈{−1,1}
1
NPγ
Pγ∑
µγ=1
〈Aγ |µγ〉2 = H+ +H− (4)
σ2 =
1
N
∑
γ
〈
A2γ
〉
= σ2+ + σ
2
− (5)
with 〈·〉 and 〈·|µγ〉 denoting time averages in the steady
state, the latter conditioned on the occurrence of the in-
formation pattern µγ . Besides these, in the present case,
it is also important to study the relative propensity of
traders to invest in a given market, namely
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FIG. 1: Analytical phase diagram of the canonical two-asset
Minority Game in the (α+, α−) plane.
m =
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈si〉 (6)
A positive (resp. negative)m indicates that agents invest
preferentially in asset +1 (resp. −1).
It is clear, already at this stage, that if no a priori cor-
relation is postulated between the news arrival processes
on the two assets µ±(t) or between the strategies adopted
by agents in the two markets, no correlation is created
by agents. Indeed
〈A+A−〉 = 1
N
∑
i,j
〈
a
µ+
i,+a
µ−
i,−
1 + si
2
1− sj
2
〉
(7)
and we know [14] that dynamical variables Uiγ(t) evolve
on timescales much longer (of order Pγ) than that over
which µγ changes. Hence we can safely assume that the
distribution of si in Eq. (7) is independent of µ±, which
allows to factor the average 〈aµ+i,+aµ−i,−〉 = 〈aµ+i,+〉〈aµ−i,−〉
over the independent information arrival processes µ±(t).
Given that 〈aµ±i,± ≈ 0 we conclude that 〈A+A−〉 ≈ 0 also.
The reason for this is that traders behavior is aimed at
detecting excess returns in the market with no consider-
ation about the correlation among assets. The quantities
defined above can be obtained both numerically and an-
alytically (in the limit N → ∞) as functions of α+ and
α−. The phase structure of the model is displayed in
Fig. 1. The (α+, α−) plane is divided in two regions
separated by a critical line. In the ergodic regime, the
system produces exploitable information, i.e. H > 0, and
the dynamics is ergodic, that is the steady state turns out
to be independent of the initialization Uiγ(0) of (1). Be-
low the critical line, instead, different initial conditions
3lead to steady states with different macroscopic prop-
erties (e.g. different volatility). In this region traders
manage to wash out the information and the system is
unpredictable (H = 0). This scenario essentially repro-
duces the standard MG phase transition picture. The
model can be solved analytically in two complementary
ways and in both cases calculations are a straightforward
generalization of those valid for the single-asset case. The
static approach relies on the fact that the stationary state
is described by the minima of the random function
H =
∑
γ∈{−1,1}
1
NPγ
Pγ∑
µγ=1

 N∑
j=1
a
µγ
jγ
1 + γmj
2


2
(8)
over the variables −1 ≤ mi = 〈si〉 ≤ 1. H coincides
with the predictability in the steady state, which implies
that speculators make the market as unpredictable as
possible. The statistical mechanics approach proceeds
by studying the properties of a system of soft spins mi
with Hamiltonian H at a fictitious inverse temperature
β in the limit N → ∞. The relevant order parameter
is the overlap Qab = (1/N)
∑
imiamib between different
minima a and b, which takes the replica-symmetric form
Qab = q + (Q − q)δab. Phases where the minimum is
unique, corresponding to H > 0, are described by tak-
ing Q → q (evidently) and χ = β(Q − q) finite in the
limit β → ∞. The condition χ → ∞ signals the phase
transition to the unpredictable phase with H = 0.
The dynamical approach employs path-integrals to
transform the N coupled single-agent processes for the
variable yi(t) = Ui,+1(t)− Ui,−1(t) into a single stochas-
tic process equivalent to the original N -agent system in
the limit N → ∞ [4]. The calculation is greatly simpli-
fied if one studies the ‘batch’ version [15], which roughly
corresponds to a time re-scaling t→ τ = t/N and, apart
from the value of σ2, has the same collective behavior.
In this case, the effective process has the form
y(τ+1) = y(τ)−
∑
γ,τ ′
[
1+
G
2αγ
]−1
(τ, τ ′)
γ + s(τ ′)
2
+z(τ)
(9)
where z(τ) is a zero-average Gaussian noise z(τ) with
correlation matrix 〈z(τ)z(τ ′)〉 = Λ(τ, τ ′) with
Λ =
∑
γ
[(
1+
G
2αγ
)−1
(nγDγ)
(
1+
G
T
2αγ
)−1]
(10)
where
Dγ(τ, τ
′) =
1
4
[1 + γm(τ) + γm(τ ′) + C(τ, τ ′)] (11)
m(τ) = 〈s(τ)〉 C(τ, τ ′) = 〈s(τ)s(τ ′)〉 (12)
while G(τ, τ ′) =
〈
∂s(τ)
∂h(τ ′)
〉
denotes the response to an in-
finitesimal probing field h(τ). Both H and σ2 can be
obtained from the asymptotic study of Λ(τ, τ). Ergodic
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FIG. 2: Behavior of m (top), H (middle) and σ2 (bottom)
versus α+ − α− for α+ + α− = 0.5. Markers correspond to
simulations with N = 256 agents, averaged over 200 disorder
samples per point. Lines are analytical results (see Appen-
dices A and B for details). In the middle panel, the dashed
line corresponds to H+ and the dot-dashed line corresponds
to H
−
.
steady states, where C(τ, τ ′) = c(τ − τ ′) and G(τ, τ ′) =
g(τ−τ ′), can be described in terms of three variables only,
namely the “magnetization” m = limτ→∞
1
τ
∑
τ ′ m(τ
′),
the persistent autocorrelation q = limτ→∞
1
τ
∑
τ ′ c(τ
′)
and the susceptibility χ = limτ→∞
∑
τ ′ G(τ
′), for which
one derives closed equations that can be solved numeri-
cally. The results for m, q and χ coincide with those ob-
tained in the static approach, thus providing a dynamic
interpretation for these quantities. It turns out that χ
diverges as the line in Fig. 1 is approached from above,
signalling ergodicity breaking and the onset of a phase in
which the steady state depends on the initial conditions
of the dynamics. We find
H =
∑
γ
α2γ(1 + 2γm+ q)
2
[2αγ + χ]2
(13)
which implies H = 0 in the non-ergodic phase.
For the volatility (of the original on-line case), one ob-
tains instead the approximate expression
σ2 = H +
1− q
2
(14)
which is very accurate in the ergodic phase. The be-
haviour of these quantities along a cut α+ + α− = con-
stant in the ergodic phase is reported in Fig. 2 together
with that of the order parameter m.
A na¨ıve argument would suggest that agents are at-
tracted by information rich markets. Instead one sees
4that, in a range of parameters, agents play preferentially
in the market with smaller information complexity αγ
and with the smallest information content Hγ . For all
those traders with |mi| < 1, the conditions for the mini-
mum of H give
mi = −
〈
a
µ+
i+A
(−i)
+
〉
+
〈
a
µ−
i− A
(−i)
−
〉
(15)
where A
(−i)
γ stands for the contribution to Aγ of all
traders except i. Hence mi equals the difference in the
payoffs of agent i against all other traders and this rela-
tion means that if mi > 0 then agent i invests preferen-
tially in asset + because that is more convenient. There-
fore, Fig. 2 implies that the relation between payoffs
and information is less obvious than the na¨ıve argument
above suggests.
This somewhat paradoxical result is due to the fact
that agents are constrained to trade in one of the two
markets. Rather than seeking the most profitable asset,
agents escape the asset where their loss is largest.
III. GRAND CANONICAL MINORITY GAME
WITH TWO ASSETS
In the grand-canonical framework players have the op-
tion not to play if their expected payoff doesn’t beat a
pre-determined benchmark (which represents for instance
a fixed interest rate or an incentive to enter the market)
[7]. As in the previous case, we consider two assets or
markets, tagged by γ ∈ {−1, 1} as before. Each trader
disposes of one quenched random strategy aiγ = {aµγiγ }
per asset, which prescribes an action a
µγ
iγ ∈ {−1, 1}
for each possible information pattern µγ ∈ {1, . . . , Pγ}.
Again µγ(t) are chosen at random independently for all
t and γ = ±1. As in the one-asset grand-canonical MG,
it is necessary to introduce a certain number of traders
– so-called producers – who invest at every time step no
matter what. These can be regarded as traders with a
fixed strategy b
µγ
iγ = ±1. The number of producers in
market γ shall be denoted by Np,γ and their aggregate
contribution to Aγ(t) by B
µγ (t)
γ =
∑Np
i=1 b
µγ(t)
i,γ . Therefore
Eq. (2) becomes
Aγ(t) =
N∑
j=1
a
µγ(t)
jγ δsj(t),γ +B
µγ (t)
γ (16)
The rest of the traders, the speculators, have an adaptive
behavior which is again governed by the dynamics (1) but
now agents can also decide not to trade. This choice is
equivalent to trading in a fictitious γ = 0 “asset” whose
cumulated score is Ui,0(t) = ǫt. More precisely
si(t) = arg max
γ∈{0,±1}
Ui,γ(t) (17)
The γ = 0 choice represents a fixed benchmark with a
constant payoff. By Eq. (17) traders invest in γ 6= 0
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FIG. 3: Behavior of m versus α+s − α
−
s for α
+
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−
s = 1 and
flat initial conditions. Markers correspond to simulations with
Ns = 200 speculators, averaged over 200 disorder samples per
point. Lines are analytical results (interrupted when the non-
ergodic phase is met, see phase diagram). Other parameters
are as follows: ǫ = 0.1, np = 1 (⋄); ǫ = 0.1, np = 0.1 (△);
ǫ = −0.1, np = 1 (©); ǫ = −0.1, np = 0.1 ().
assets only if their score exceeds that of the benchmark,
i.e. if the corresponding score Uiγ grows at least as ǫt.
Notice that agents are allowed to invest in at most one
asset. If agents were allowed to invest in both γ = ±1
assets if Ui,±(t) > Ui,0(t) then it is easy to see that the
model becomes equivalent to two un-coupled GCMGs.
The arguments of the previous section show that also
in this case no significant correlation between assets is
introduced by the behavior of speculators. Again the
collective properties of the stationary state can be char-
acterized by the predictability H , Eq. (4), the volatil-
ity σ2, Eq. (5) and the “magnetization” m of Eq. (6).
These parameters can be studied as before upon varying
the parameters αγ = Pγ/N and ǫ. We also introduce the
relative number of producers np = Np,γ/Pγ , which for
simplicity is assumed to be the same for both assets. No-
tice that for np = 0 and ǫ → −∞ we recover the model
of the previous section where there are no producers and
speculators are forced to trade.
We focus first on m (see Fig. 3). One sees that when
traders have positive incentives to trade (ǫ < 0) the mar-
ket behaves as in the previous section, with speculators
investing preferentially in the asset with less information.
This tendency becomes less pronounced the larger is np,
which is reasonable in view of our discussion above, be-
cause then the game becomes more and more profitable
for speculators.
This scenario is qualitatively reproduced at all ǫ < 0
and it changes drastically as soon as ǫ > 0. In this case,
traders concentrate most of their investments into the
information-rich asset even if np is very low. The fact
that traders can refrain from investing implies that trad-
5ing is dominated by gain seeking rather than escaping
losses.
The theory for this case is slightly more involved than
for the canonical model. On the static side, the Hamil-
tonian is now
Hǫ =
∑
γ=±1
1
NPγ
Pγ∑
µγ=1

 N∑
j=1
a
µγ
jγ π
γ
j +B
µγ
γ


2
+
2ǫ
N
N∑
j=1
π0j
(18)
where πγi = 〈δsi,γ〉 denotes the frequency with which
agent i invests in asset γ = 0,±1 in the steady state.
Notice that H0 = H is the predictability. As before, it
is necessary to introduce a fictitious temperature β > 0
and turn to the replica trick to analyze the minima of
Hǫ over {πγi } considering the limit β → ∞. The main
difference with the canonical model lies in the fact that
one must now consider an overlap order parameter per
asset, namely Qγab = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 π
γ
iaπ
γ
ib (a, b = 1, . . . , r,
γ = ±1) and, in the replica-symmetric Ansatz, one ‘sus-
ceptibility’ per asset, that is χγ = β(Qγ − qγ).
Again these quantities can be given a dynamic inter-
pretation with the generating function approach [4]. This
approach leads, in the batch approximation, to two effec-
tive processes (one per asset), namely
Uγ(τ + 1) = Uγ(τ)− ǫ+ zγ(τ)
√
1 + αγnp
− (1 + αγnp)
∑
τ ′
[1+ λγGγ ]
−1
(τ, τ ′)φγ(τ
′) (19)
where λγ =
1+αγnp
αγ
and the noise correlations are de-
scribed by the matrices Λγ(τ, τ
′) = 〈zγ(τ)zγ(τ ′)〉 with
Λγ =
[
(1+ λγGγ)
−1
(λγCγ)
(
1+ λγG
T
γ
)−1]
(20)
Cγ(τ, τ
′) = 〈φγ(τ)φγ(τ ′)〉 Gγ(τ, τ ′) =
〈
∂φγ(τ)
∂hγ(τ ′)
〉
(21)
In order to characterize time-translation invariant and
ergodic steady states four quantities are now re-
quired, namely two persistent autocorrelations qγ =
limτ,τ0→∞
1
τ
∑τ
τ ′=1 Cγ(τ0, τ0+τ
′) and two susceptibilities
χγ = limτ,τ0→∞
∑τ
τ ′=1Gγ(τ0, τ0 + τ
′), γ ∈ {−1, 1}. For
these, one obtains equations that can be solved numeri-
cally and the quantity m can be written in terms of the
qγ ’s and the χγ ’s. Now ergodicity breaking is connected
to the divergence of at least one of the susceptibilities.
The behavior of the model is considerably richer than
in the previous case: For ǫ 6= 0 we find that Hǫ has a
unique non-degenerate minimum and both χγ ’s are fi-
nite. The case ǫ = 0 is peculiar as it marks the boundary
between two different behaviors ǫ < 0 and ǫ > 0. For
ǫ = 0 and α± large enough, both markets are predictable
(H0 > 0) and the susceptibility is finite. However, one
of the susceptibilities diverges while the other stays fi-
nite for lower values of α±. This signals the onset of a
phase where one of the markets is unpredictable while
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram of the ǫ = 0, np = 1 grand-canonical
two-asset Minority Game in the (α+s , α
−
s ) plane. The continu-
ous line is analytical, the other phase boundaries are obtained
from numerical simulations (averages over 100 disorder sam-
ples per point).
still H0 > 0, a situation with particularly striking dy-
namical consequences. As a result, the phase structure
of this model is rather complex (see Fig. 4). We have
been unable to obtain analytical lines for the complete
phase structure at ǫ = 0. The phase boundary sepa-
rating the region with H = 0 from that with H > 0
has been calculated assuming that both susceptibilities
diverge keeping a finite ratio χ+/χ−. The phase bound-
ary of the non-ergodic region (which would correspond
to the divergence of just one of the susceptibilities) has
been instead estimated from numerical simulations and
the corresponding lines must be considered a crude ap-
proximation.
Fig. 5 shows the magnetization as a function of α+ −
α− along the cut α+ + α− = 0.4 in the phase diagram.
This line is entirely contained in the non-ergodic phase.
While the market remains globally predictable (H > 0)
the fact that one of the markets becomes unpredictable
(e.g. H+ = 0) implies that the steady state depends
on initial conditions. It is finally worth mentioning that
the non-ergodic regimes with one unpredictable market
extend to large values of αγ .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a multi-asset version of the Minority
Game in order to address the problem of how adaptive
heterogeneous agents would diversify their investments
when the different assets bear different levels of informa-
tion. While the phase structure of the models is substan-
tially a generalization of that of single-asset games, we
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−
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s = 0.4,
ǫ = 0, np = 1 and biased initial conditions (∆U = Ui+(0) −
Ui−(0)). Markers correspond to simulations with N = 200
speculators, averaged over 200 disorder samples per point.
have found, in the grand-canonical model, a remarkable
dependence of the probability to invest in a certain asset
on the agent’s incentives to trade (ǫ). Specifically, agents
who have no incentives to trade other than the gains
derived from it, invest preferentially in information-rich
assets. On the contrary, when there are positive incen-
tives to trade (ǫ < 0) agents invest more likely in the
information-poor asset. This same behaviour is found in
the canonical model, where agents must choose one asset
at each time step and cannot refrain from entering the
market.
The generalization of our results to a larger number
of assets or to a wider strategy pool for the agents is
straightforward. The results discussed here are indicative
of the generic qualitative behavior we expect.
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